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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARJORIE J. DURAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,,
vs.

Case No. 19033

CEDAR CITY CORPORATION,
H. L. BRADLEY, ARTHUR 0.
STEWART and GRANT HINCHCLIFF,
Defendants-Respondents.
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover damages for plaintiff's personal injuries occurring when a subject of an arrest fired a
rifle at the defendant police officers and a bullet entered
the plaintiff's nearby trailer home.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and entered summary judgment in favor of defendants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek affirmance of the summary judgment of the
lower court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff has failed to comply with this court's Order of
October 3, 1983 in that her Statement of Facts contains no
citations to the record on appeal and thereby fails to conform with Rule 75(p), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rather

than controverting each of the numerous facts alleged in
plaintiff's Statement of Facts that are totally unsupported
by the record/ defendants submit the following Statement of
Facts/ which is fully supported by the record.
On February 21, 1979# shortly after midnight/ defendants
H. L. Bradley (hereinafter "Bradley")/ Arthur 0. Stewart
(hereinafter "Stewart") and Grant Hinchcliff (hereinafter
"Hinchcliff")/ three officers of the Police Department of
defendant Cedar City Corporation, were involved in a gunfight
with Mr. Neil Anderson (hereinafter "Neil") at Kelly's
Trailer Park in Cedar City, Utah.
the death of Neil.

The gunfight resulted in

Plaintiff/ another resident of Kelly's

Trailer Park/ received a gunshot wound in her right foot/
resulting in the injuries of which she complains.

(R. 54,

Deposition of Marjorie Jane Durand at 35-37).
Earlier, on the evening of February 20/ 1979, Neil was a
passenger in a vehicle being driven by Eugene Anderson (hereinafter "Eugene")/ his brother. At approximately 11:20 that
evening, Hinchcliff and officer Bruce Marshall/ also of the
i
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Cedar City Police Department, stopped the vehicle Eugene was
driving because they suspected that he was operating the
vehicle under the influence of alcohol.

Upon approaching the

Anderson vehicle, it was apparent to the officers that both
were intoxicated.

Eugene was arrested for driving under the

influence of alcohol and both Andersons were taken to the
Iron County jail.

(R. 21, HIT 2-3). After breathalyzer tests

were performed at the jail, Hinchcliff contacted Neil's wife,
Sharlene Anderson (hereinafter "Sharlene"), and requested
that she come to the jail and transport Neil to the Anderson
home (the car was impounded as neither Eugene nor Neil were
fit to drive).

When Sharlene arrived, she protested taking

her husband home because in her opinion he could be argumentative and make trouble when intoxicated.

Nevertheless,

because Neil was controllable and cooperative, he was
released to his wife's custody and was taken home.

(R. 21,

HIT 4-5; R. 29, Iff 2-4).
When Neil arrived at home, he began making threats about
getting his gun and returning to the jail to obtain his
brother's release by force.

Sharlene, alarmed by her hus-

band's conduct, telephoned the Cedar City Police Department
offices and notified the person answering that her husband
was being very abusive and threatening force with his gun.
(R. 21, H 6; R. 22, 1T 2; R. 23, IT 2; R. 29, If 4 ) .
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Bradley, Stewart and Hinchcliff responded to Sharlene's
call and traveled to the trailer park in two separate patrol
cars.

When they arrived at the Anderson trailer, Bradley

observed Neil inside with a rifle in his hand.

Sharlene

believes that Bradley could have disarmed Neil in the
trailer.

(R. 29, 1F 4 ) . However, Bradley states that when he

approached the trailer, Neil had the rifle in his hands and
there was no opportunity to disarm him.

(R. 22, UU 5-6). It

is undisputed that at some time all the officers retreated
and Neil stepped onto the porch with the rifle.

Despite the

efforts of the three officers, and Sharlene, to assure Neil
that Eugene was being released from jail, Neil would not put
the gun down.

(R. 21, HIT 7, 9-11; R. 22, HIT 3-5, 7-8; R. 23,

ITU 3-5, 7-8; R. 29, f 4 ) .
Plaintiff's trailer was located across the street west of
the Anderson trailer and was situated such that the south
half of it was in a direct line with the porch where Neil was
standing.

Stewart took a position in a small grassy area

slightly northwest of the porch where Neil was standing and
due east of plaintiff's trailer.

Hinchcliff took cover in

the street behind a pickup truck northwest of the Anderson
trailer and Bradley took cover behind the northwest corner of
the Anderson trailer.

(R. 21, HIT 8-10, 12 & attached dia-

gram; R. 22, 1M 3, 5, 7; R. 23, 11T 3-5, 1, 10).
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While pointing the rifle in Stewart's direction, Neil
fired the rifle and Stewart heard the bullet pass him to the
right, heading directly toward plaintiff's trailer.

All

three officers returned fire, striking Neil, who collapsed,
firing one more round that struck a Chevrolet parked in the
Anderson driveway.

Stewart and the other officers were at

all times standing with their backs to plaintiff's trailer
during the exchange of gunfire.

(R. 21, 1J1F 12-15, 17; R. 22,

U1F 10-12, 14; R. 23, 1111 10-12, 15). Indeed, plaintiff admits
in her deposition that the bullet that entered her trailer
and hit her came from the direction of the Anderson trailer.
(R. 54, Deposition of Marjorie Jane Durand at 41-44 & Exhibit
1).

There is no evidence that the bullet that injured plain-

tiff was fired by anyone other than Neil.
ARGUMENT
Although it is unclear from a reading of plaintiff's
brief, she apparently maintains that there are three genuine
issues of material fact:
1.

Whether defendants were negligent in allowing Neil

to leave the jail in a drunken condition with full knowledge
of his dangerous nature and propensity for violence;

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2.

Whether defendants were negligent in failing to

respond to Sharlene's call in a professional manner by failing to disarm Neil and confronting him, resulting in the
exchange of gunfire; and
3.

Whether defendants' acts should be legally pro-

tected.
The third issue is clearly a question of law answered in
the affirmative by the lower court.

It is, of course, one of

the ultimate legal issues to be decided by this court.
Neither the affidavit of Sharlene Rowley nor the deposition of plaintiff, the only evidence presented to counter
2
defendants' affidavits, raise any genuine issue as to
whether defendants were negligent.

Indeed, even when the

1

Plaintiff has apparently abandoned her previous
claim that defendants were negligent in scattering gunfire in
the trailer park.
2
Plaintiff submitted the affidavits of Patrick H.
Fenton and Jay Jenson at the time of the original hearing on
the Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 28, 30). The affidavit
of Patrick H. Fenton merely contained the opinions, interpretations and conclusions of counsel regarding the affidavits
of Hinchcliff, Bradley and Stewart, a function that is the
province of the court. The affidavit of Jay Jenson expressed
an opinion concerning the bullet that entered plaintiff's
trailer, which opinion was wholly without foundation. Both
affidavits would be inadmissible as evidence. Therefore,
both affidavits were properly stricken by the lower court
pursuant to Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274,
508 P.2d 538, 542 (1973). See also Go Real Estate Co. v.
Smyth, No. 19057 (Utah November 4, 1983).
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facts are viewed entirely in plaintiff's favor and even if
defendants were shown to be negligent in some respect, such
facts are immaterial because defendants had no special duty
to protect plaintiff and her claims are barred by the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
POINT I
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT NEGLIGENT, AS A MATTER
OF LAW
The affidavits submitted by both parties, and any other
facts presently in the record, establish that there is no
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendants
were negligent.
In general, this court has defined negligence as "the
failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would have
done under the circumstances, or doing what such person under
such circumstances would not have done."

Meese v. Brigham

Young University, 639 P.2d 720, 723 (Utah 1981).

Accord,

Evans v. Stuart, 17 Utah 2d 308, 410 P.2d 999, 1001 (1966).
An application of the definition of negligence to the
circumstances indicates that there is no issue as to whether
defendants were negligent; they clearly were not.

While

plaintiff claims that defendants negligently released Neil,
it is clear they had no legal basis to hold him.

Neil could

not be held for drunken driving since he was not driving, nor
could defendants legally have held Neil simply because
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Sharlene was concerned about what he might do, especially
since Neil was cooperative and rational when leaving the
jail.

Having no realistic basis to detain Neil, defendants

had no choice but to release him.

Thus, under the circum-

stances of the situation, defendants could not be negligent
for releasing Anderson.
Plaintiff then claims that defendants were negligent in
failing to disarm Neil and choosing instead to confront him
in the gunfight.

Assuming that Bradley or any of the other

defendants had an opportunity to disarm Neil in the trailer,
as suggested by the affidavit of Sharlene Rowley, there is no
evidence that their failure to do so constituted negligence.
Sharlene offers the unsupported opinion that Bradley could
have disarmed Neil, yet offers no explanation as to how it
could have been accomplished.

It is clear that she is

attempting to second-guess Bradley's decision.

Bradley had

no knowledge of the conditions in the trailer.

Under the

circumstances, it would have been unreasonable for Bradley or
the other defendants to risk their lives and the lives of
others, perhaps children, to attempt to disarm Neil and confront him in the confined trailer.

Surely, defendants cannot

be negligent in failing, by some undisclosed method, to disarm Anderson under the circumstances at the time.
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Furthermore, what choice did defendants have once Neil
came onto the porch with a rifle pointed at them?

No reason-

able person would expect them to request Neil to go to a
secluded field to wield his gun and shoot at defendants.
Under the circumstances, defendants had no choice but to confront Anderson in the trailer park.
POINT II
DEFENDANTS OWED PLAINTIFF NO INDIVIDUAL
DUTY TO PROTECT HER FROM HARM
Even assuming that defendants were negligent in some
respect, such negligence is not material because without the
breach of legally recognized duty, there can be no recovery.
"Negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.n
F. Pollock, Law of Torts 468 (13th ed. 1929).
Defendants do not deny that the police have a general
duty to protect the health, lives and morals of the public.
However, a city or its police have no duty to an individual
for injuries directly resulting from the criminal acts of a
third person, even if the city or its police somehow breached
the general duty to protect the safety of the public.

In

Obray v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160 (1971), plaintiff filed suit against the Cache County Sheriff and his
deputy seeking damages and the officers1 removal from office
for their alleged willful and wanton failure to investigate a
burglary of the plaintiff's store.

Upon defendants1 motion,

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the lower court dismissed the complaint.
court affirmed the dismissal.

On appeal, this

Citing Massengill v. Yuma

County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969), this court wrote:
[W]e believe that defendants1 contention that failure by a public sheriff to investigate a crime
claimed by an individual to have been committed,
ordinarily is a matter of judgment and discretion,
not actionable or compensable, and not pursuable by
an individual since the public officialfs duty is to
the public, - he being accountable to and removable
in a proper proceeding, by the public.
Obray v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (footnotes
omitted).
In Massengill, a deputy sheriff failed to apprehend and
arrest two speeding, intoxicated drivers before they were
involved in an accident resulting in the death of plaintiffs'
decedent.

The trial court dismissed the action by plaintiffs

against the County and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the defendant owed no duty to the deceased as an
individual.

Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456

P.2d 376, 381 (1969).

The Arizona court further stated that

the duty imposed upon a police officer was a duty to the public in general and not to any particular person.

Accord-

ingly, the failure to adequately discharge a police officer's
function would result in a public rather than a private
injury, with recourse being had, if at all, through public
prosecution rather than through a civil action for damages.
Id., 456 P.2d at 379.
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Another case supporting the Obray rule is Keane v. City
of Chicago, 98 111. App. 2d 460, 240 N.E.2d 321 (1968).
There, the trial court dismissed an action brought by the
husband of a school teacher for failing to provide police
protection to the teacher, who was attacked and killed by a
student while on school premises.

The Illinois Court of

Appeals affirmed, holding that the duty of the city to protect the plaintiff's decedent from criminal acts was no
greater than its "general duty to all citizens to protect the
safety and well-being of the public at large."

Ijd. at 322.

The court also provided the following public policy support
for its holding that there should be no recovery for breach
of a general public duty:
To hold that under the circumstances alleged in the
complaint the city owed a "special duty" to Mrs.
Keane for the safety and well-being of her person
would impose an all but impossible burden upon the
City, considering the numerous police, fire, housing
and other laws, ordinances and regulations in force.
Id.

Accord, Simpson Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville,

149 Ind. App. 387, 272 N.E.2d 871, 873-76 (1971).
The proposition that defendants owed plaintiff no special
duty is further illustrated in Evers v. Westerberg, 38 A.D.2d
751, 329 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1972).

There, the police allowed an

intoxicated motorist to drive his car away from the scene of
an accident.

The driver was involved in a second collision

some 20 minutes later, killing another motorist.
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The lower

court entered judgment for plaintiff, who was administratrix
of the estate of the deceased motorist.

The New York Supreme

Court, Appellate Division, modified the judgment, holding
that although the intoxicated driver defendant was liable,
the defendant village was not liable for failing to arrest
the intoxicated driver and allowing him to leave the scene of
the first accident.

The court further stated:

It is well settled that a municipality, acting
in its governmental capacity for the protection of
the general public, cannot be cast in damages for a
mere failure to furnish adequate protection to a
particular individual to whom it has assumed no
special duty. The Village's alleged failure to
enforce its regulations and the Vehicle and Traffic
Law by arresting Westerberg for intoxication, taking
his car keys or impounding his automobile falls
squarely within this rule of nonliability. It owed
no special duty to Mr. and Mrs. Evers and through
its officers, did not take any affirmative action
which resulted in injury to a member of the public.
Id., 329 N.Y.S.2d at 618 (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).

Accord, Evett v. City of Inverness, 224 So. 2d

365, 366-67 (Fla. App. 1969).
In the instant case, plaintiff cannot demonstrate any
special duties owed to her by defendants, aside from their
general duty to protect the public.

Indeed, the negligence,

if any, of defendants in releasing Neil from police custody
while he was still intoxicated, or in failing to disarm him,
is much less culpable than that of the police in Evers, who
released an intoxicated driver who they did have a legal
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basis to detain and who had already been involved in one
accident.
In the event that plaintiff's earlier additional contention that defendants were negligent in scattering gunfire
comes before this court, there is overwhelming authority, in
addition to the foregoing, to the effect that municipalities
are not liable for injuries to others resulting from the fulfillment or breach of the general duty to apprehend wrongdoers.

See, e.g., Roll v. Timberman, 94 N.J. Super. 530, 229

A.2d 281, 284 (1967) (police not liable for injuries to
bystander, caused by apprehension of fleeing motorist whose
reckless acts are the proximate cause of the injuries); Scott
v. City of New York, 2 A.D.2d 854, 155 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788
(1956) (innocent bystander injured by gunshot wound resulting
from police apprehension of escaped prisoner cannot recover
from city who owed no special duty to bystander even if the
police were negligent in permitting the escape), aff *d, 9
N.Y.2d 764, 215 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1961).
Based upon Obray and the ample authority from other
jurisdictions, it is evident that even if defendants were
somehow negligent by releasing the intoxicated Neil, in failing to disarm him, or in confronting Neil in the gunfight and
scattering gunfire, they cannot be liable to plaintiff
because she has not shown, and cannot show, that defendants
breached any more than their general duty to the public.
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Thus# although plaintiff could perhaps maintain a cause of
action against Neil's estate for Neil's acts in initiating
the confrontation with defendants, she has no basis for
recovery against defendants.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
A.

Plaintiff's Claims are Barred by Governmental Immunity,

Aside from the fact that defendants cannot be liable to
plaintiff for any negligent breach of their general duty to
the public, they are immune from suit under the provisions of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, which provides:

"Except

as may be otherwise provided in this Act, all governmental
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results
from the exercise of a governmental function . . • ."

Utah

Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (Supp. 1983).
There is no dispute that defendants were involved in a
governmental function under the test established in
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., G05 P.2d 1230 (Utah
1980).

There, this court stated the following general rule

for determining whether an activity is a governmental function:

"[T]he test for determining governmental immunity is

whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique
nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency
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or that it is essential to the core of governmental activity."

Id. at 1236-37.

Nothing could be more essential to the core of governmental activity than the enforcement of the laws and maintenance
of peace and order performed by a city police department and
its officers.

Consequently, other provisions of the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act apply.

The applicable section of

the act provides:
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for injury proximately caused by negligent
act or omission of an employee committed within the
scope of his employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of
mance or the failure to
discretionary function,
cretion is abused . . .

the exercise or perforexercise or perform a
whether or not the dis.

Id., § 63-30-10(1)(a) (emphasis added).
Assuming defendants had a choice regarding whether to
release Neil or whether to disarm or confront him, those
choices were discretionary functions within the meaning of
Section 63-30-10(1)(a).

Although plaintiff argues that these

decisions were a matter of "duty", not discretion, she cites
no legal authority in support of that contention.
This court has applied Section 63-30-10(1)(a) to a fact
situation analogous to the one at bar.

In Epting v. State,

546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976), the minor children of a murder
victim sued the State of Utah on the theory that its
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employees were negligent in allowing a state prison inmate to
go on a work release program from which the prisoner left and
murdered plaintiffs1 mother.

The trial court dismissed the

complaint and this court affirmed, holding that the prison
officials were involved in the exercise of a discretionary
function when they placed the prisoner on work release and
thus were immune from suit under Section 63-30-10(1)(a).

The

court further stated that it was discretionary with prison
officials as to whether it would be valuable and practicable
to place a particular prisoner on the work release program.
Id. at 243-44.

See also Amato v. United States, 549 F. Supp.

863, 866 (D.N.J. 1982) (decision not to arrest person prior
to his commission of bank robbery that it was known by police
officers would be committed was a discretionary function
under the virtually identical discretionary function exemption of the Federal Tort Claims Act). In the instant case,
the decision of whether to release Neil, assuming there was
some legal ground to hold him the first place, was also discretionary and defendants are immune from suit pursuant to
Section 63-30-10(1)(a).
At best, the only possible legal basis that defendants
had for arresting and holding Neil (a basis that is only tenuously supported by the record) was for the offense of intoxication.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701 (Supp. 1983).
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However,

Section 76-9-701 further provides that a peace officer may at
his discretion release an individual arrested for intoxication if he believes imprisonment would be unnecessary.
§ 76-9-701(2).

Id.

Thus, even if defendants could have held Neil

for intoxication, the very statute giving them the right to
hold Neil provides that the decision to release him was the
exercise of a discretionary function.
According to the Florida Supreme Court, the decision not
to disarm Neil and to otherwise confront him was also discretionary.

In Wong v. City of Miami, 237 So. 2d 132 (Fla.

1970), plaintiffs alleged that a decision not to confront
political demonstrators constituted negligence and had proximately caused property damage that resulted when the demonstration got out of control.

The lower court dismissed the

complaint and both the Florida Court of Appeals and the
Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the decision of
whether to confront the demonstrators was discretionary, and
that the decisionmakers were not subject to liability.
court stated further:
While sovereign immunity is a salient issue
here, we ought not lose sight of the fact that
inherent in the right to exercise police powers is
the right to determine strategy and tactics for the
deployment of those powers . . . .
The sovereign
authorities ought to be left free to exercise their
discretion and choose the tactics deemed appropriate
without worry over possible allegations of negligence.
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The

Id.

at 134.
The rule of Wong is applicable in the instant case. The

decision of whether to release Neil and the decision of
whether to attempt to disarm him or confront him were decisions involving judgment, tactics and strategy.

The defen-

dants were confronted with a dangerous and difficult situation which they handled as well as they could, and according
to their own best judgment.

Their actions should not be

judicially second-guessed since they clearly involve matters
of discretion.

Therefore, pursuant to Section

63-30-10(1) (a), defendants are immune from suit and plaintiff's action against them should be barred.
B.

Plaintiff's Claims are Barred by Virtue of Her Failing to Comply with Sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-19 of
the Governmental Immunity Act.

In addition to providing defendants immunity from suit in
this case, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires that
plaintiff file a proper and adequate notice of claim and that
she provide or file a bond or undertaking.

Contrary to

plaintiff's contention that these procedural requirements
were raised by separate motion, defendants1 original Motion
for Summary Judgment specifically states as one of its
grounds that plaintiff failed to comply with the above
requirements.

Thus, since the lower court's reasons for
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granting the summary judgment were not stated (R. 46, 47),
plaintiff's failure to comply with these provisions could
well have been a basis for the grant of summary judgment.
In Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480,
482 (Utah 1975), this Court stated that "full compliance with
[the Utah Governmental Immunity Act] requirements is a condition precedent to the right to maintain a suit."

Plaintiff

has failed to properly comply with Sections 63-30-11 and
63-30-19 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
The 1978 version of Section 63-30-11, the version most
likely applicable here, provides:
Any person having a claim for injury to person or
property against a governmental entity or its
employee shall, before maintaining an action under
this act, file a written notice of claim with such
entity for appropriate relief including money damages. The notice of claim shall set forth a brief
statement of the facts and the nature of the claim
asserted, shall be signed by the person making the
claim or such person's agent, attorney, parent or
legal guardian, and shall be directed and delivered
to the responsible governmental entity within the
time prescribed in section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13, as
applicable.
Id., § 63-30-11 (Supp. 1981).

See also Yates v. Vernal

Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1980);
Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480, 482
(Utah 1975).
Defendants admit that plaintiff filed a purported notice
of claim with the Cedar City Corporation and that it was
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filed within the prescribed time.

A copy of the notice of

claim that was filed is attached as Exhibit "F" to plaintiff's brief.

However, that purported notice of claim did

not comply with the essentials established in Section
63-30-11.
sions.

It merely reports facts and makes legal conclu-

There is no formal demand for any kind of money dam-

ages or other relief from the city.
of the claim asserted is unclear.

Furthermore, the nature

Consequently, since the

purported notice of claim attached to plaintiff's brief is
improper, and plaintiff failed to file a proper and timely
notice of claim within one year after the cause of action
arose, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (Supp. 1983), she is barred
from maintaining this action.
Even assuming that plaintiff has filed a proper and
timely notice of claim in compliance with Section 63-30-11,
she has not obtained or filed a bond as required under Section 63-30-19.

Plaintiff has evidently filed a bond pursuant

to Section 78-11-10 of the Utah Code, as required by virtue
of her action against the three individual respondents in
this case, but Section 63-30-19 requires an additional bond
be filed in order for plaintiff to maintain an action against
Cedar City Corporation.

It provides:

At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall
file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, but
in no case less than the sum of $300, conditioned
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upon payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs
incurred by the governmental entity in the action if
the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails
to recover judgment.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19 (1978).

Based upon Scarborough,

appellant's failure to provide and file the bond required by
Section 63-30-19 precludes her from pursuing this action.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to file a proper and timely notice
of claim and has failed to obtain and file an appropriate
bond as required by Sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-19 of the
Governmental Immunity Act.
the outset.

Thus, her action is precluded at

But, even assuming plaintiff has met these pro-

cedural requirements, her action still fails on the merits.
The record establishes that there is no genuine issue of
material fact.

Defendants were not negligent, as a matter of

law, since under the circumstances, they simply had no choice
but to act as they did.
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendants were negligent in
some respect, such negligence at best amounted to only a
breach of a general duty owed to the public at large for
which defendants cannot be held civilly liable to plaintiff.
Finally, pursuant to Section 63-30-10(1)(a) of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, defendants are immune from suit
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since their alleged acts of negligence involved the performance of a discretionary function.

Consequently, plaintiff's

action is barred.
For the above reasons, the summary judgment of the lower
court should be affirmed.
DATED this

day of November, 1983.
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Attotaeys for Respondents
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